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vj)

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

This court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code § 78A-3-103(j).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Issue 1) Whether Anderson's motion for summary judgment (Defendant's Motion to

Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment) (Record 93) should have been denied
on its face because it did not comply with Utah R. Civ. P. 56(a)(l) 1 as it failed to meet the
requirements of Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c){l )(A) 2 where Anderson's motion did not include
citations to "particular parts of materials in the record," but rather, relied upon the fact that
his Memorandum was "Verified" by him, but it did not state that "the facts set forth in the
pleading were true and correct to the personal knowledge of the signer," it "attempt[ed] to
verify the entire contents of the pleading, not just the factual assertions," and "some of the
facts sworn to were not specific evidentiary facts at all, but were mere assumptions or
conclusions." Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 696, 698 (UT 1985).

vJ
This is a question of law, and the standard of appellate review is de novo. Helf v.
1

vJ

"( 1) Instead of a statement of the facts under Rule 7, a motion for summary
judgment must contain a statement of material facts claimed not to be genuinely disputed.
Each fact must be separately stated in numbered paragraphs and supported by citing to
materials in the record under paragraph (c)( 1) of this rule."

2

"A party asserting that a fact cannot be genuinely disputed or is genuinely disputed
must support the assertion by:"

yj}

(A) citing to particular parts ofmaterials in the record, including depositions,
documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations,
stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only),
admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials .... ( emphasis added).
-1-
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Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 2015 UT 81, ,r 34,361 P.3d 63, 71 {UT 2015) ("We review the district
court's interpretation of [the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure] de novo."). The issue was
preserved for review because Gardiner presented the issue in his Memorandum In Opposition
To Defendant's Motion To Dismiss Or In The Alternative For Summary Judgment (Record
130), although the district court did not address the issue in its Ruling And Order Re:
Dispositive Motions. Record 334 (Addendum 11). Helfv. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 2015 UT
81, ,r 42, 361 P.3d 63, 73 (UT 2015) ("'An issue is preserved for appeal when it has been
presented to the district court in such a way that the court has an opportunity to rule on [it].'
(Citation omitted). The fundamental purpose of the preservation rule is to ensure that the
district court had a chance to rule on an issue before an appellate court will address it.").

Issue 2) Whether Gardiner's motion for summary judgment (Record I 68) should have
been granted because Anderson's opposition (Defendant's Reply and Objection to Plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment) (Record 286) was stricken by the district court (as it did not
comply with Utah R. Civ. P. 7(d)(l) (time to file opposition; title of memorandum) or Utah
R. Civ. P. 56(a)(2) (grounds for facts in dispute)), but the district court nonetheless
"consider[ed] arguments and material" from Anderson's motion for summary judgment
(Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment) (Record 93)
"in determining the cross motions for summary judgment in this case." Order On Motions
To Strike at 3 (Record 368, 3 71) (Addendum 2 I).
This is a question oflaw, and the standard of appellate review is de novo. Helf v.

-2-
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Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 2015 UT 81,134,361 P.3d 63, 71 (UT 2015) ("We review the district
court's interpretation of [the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure] de novo."). The issue was
preserved for review because the district court issued an Order On Motions To Strike (Record
368) (Addendum 19) in which it struck Defendant's Reply and Objection to Plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment (Record 286), but nonetheless "consider[ed] arguments and
material from Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment
[Anderson's motion for summary judgment] filed on June 1, 2016 in determining the cross
motions for summary judgment in this case." Order On Motions To Strike at 3 (Record 368,
371) (Addendum 21).
Issue 3) Whether there is a remedy in damages for breach of a lease wherein the lease
~

prohibited the tenant from subleasing the premises without the landlord's written consent,
the tenant sublet the premises without the landlord's written consent, and the lease did not
provide a measure of damages for such a breach. 3

vJ

This is a question of law, and the standard of appellate review is de novo.
Manzanares v. Byington (In re Adoption of Baby B.), 2012 UT 35,141,308 P.3d 382,393

vi

(UT 2012) ("No deference is given to the lower court's analysis of abstract legal questions.
This is because the lower court has no comparative advantage in resolving legal questions

3

Gardiner is not seeking review of that part of the district court's Ruling And Order
Re: Dispositive Motions (Record 334; Addendum 11) relating to his claim for Unlawful
Detainer (First Claim For Relief). Further, Gardiner consented to dismissal of his Third
Claim For Relief (Unjust Enrichment).
-3-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

and settled appellate precedent is of crucial importance in establishing a clear, uniform body
of law. Our review of conclusions of law is accordingly de novo. We take a fresh look at
questions of law decided by a lower court, according no deference to its resolution of such
issues."). The issue was preserved for review because the district court issued a Ruling And

Order Re: Dispositive Motions on December 27, 2016 holding that, while Anderson
"breached the lease" (Ruling And Order Re: Dispositive Motions at 6) (Record 334, 340)
(Addendum 16), the lease "does not provide for damages as requested by Plaintiff." Ruling

And Order Re: Dispositive Motions at 8 (Record 334, 342) (Addendum 18).
Issue 4) Whether Gardiner should have been awarded a reasonable attorney's fee and

costs and expenses where Anderson was found to have breached the lease and thus was in
"default in the performance" of the lease pursuant to Paragraph 23.
This is a question of law, and the standard of appellate review is de novo.

Manzanares v. Byington (In re Adoption of Baby B.), 2012 UT 35,141,308 P.3d 382,393
(UT 2012) ("No deference is given to the lower court's analysis of abstract legal questions.
This is because the lower court has no comparative advantage in resolving legal questions
and settled appellate precedent is of crucial importance in establishing a clear, uniform body
of law. Our review of conclusions of law is accordingly de novo. We take a fresh look at
questions of law decided by a lower court, according no deference to its resolution of such
issues."). The issue was preserved for review because Gardiner requested a reasonable
attorney's fee in his Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment. Record 168. The district

-4-
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court did not address the issue, however, in its Ruling And Order Re: Dispositive Motions
(Record 334) (Addendum 11 ), presumably because, having held that the lease "does not
provide for damages as requested by Plaintiff' (Ruling And Order Re: Dispositive Motions
at 8 (Record 334, 342) (Addendum I 8)), Gardiner was also not eligible for a reasonable
attorney's fee. Helfv. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 2015 UT 81,142,361 P.3d 63, 73 (UT 2015)
("' An issue is preserved for appeal when it has been presented to the district court in such
a way that the court has an opportunity to rule on [it].' (Citation omitted). The fundamental
purpose of the preservation rule is to ensure that the district court had a chance to rule on an
issue before an appellate court will address it.").
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION AND RULES
Art. I, Sec. 11, Constitution of Utah:

vJ

All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course oflaw, which
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall
be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by
himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party.
Utah R. Civ. P. 7(d)(l):

lj

A nonmoving party may file a memorandum opposing the motion within 14
days after the motion is filed. The nonmoving party must title the
memorandum substantially as: "Memorandum opposing motion [short phrase
describing the relief requested]." The memorandum must include under
appropriate headings and in the following order:

vJ

(A) a concise statement of the party's preferred disposition of the motion and
the grounds supporting that disposition;
(B) one or more sections that include a concise statement of the relevant facts
-5-
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claimed by the nonmoving party and argument citing authority for that
disposition; and
(C) objections to evidence in the motion, citing authority for the objection.
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(a):
A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense
-- or the part of each claim or defense -- on which summary judgment is
sought. The court shall grant summary judgment if the moving party shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court should state on the record
the reasons for granting or denying the motion. The motion and memoranda
must follow Rule 7 as supplemented below.
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(a)(l ):

(I) Instead of a statement of the facts under Rule 7, a motion for summary
judgment must contain a statement of material facts claimed not to be
genuinely disputed. Each fact must be separately stated in numbered
paragraphs and supported by citing to materials in the record under paragraph
(c)(I) of this rule.
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(a)(2):
(2) Instead of a statement of the facts under Rule 7, a memorandum opposing
the motion must include a verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's
facts that is disputed with an explanation of the grounds for the dispute
supported by citing to materials in the record under paragraph (c)(I) of this
rule.
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(a)(4):
(4) Each material fact set forth in the motion or in the memorandum opposing
the motion under paragraphs (a)(l) and (a)(2) that is not disputed is deemed
admitted for the purposes of the motion.
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c)(l)(A):
A party asserting that a fact cannot be genuinely disputed or is genuinely
-6-
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disputed must support the assertion by:
(A) citing to particular parts ofmaterials in the record, including depositions,
documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations,
stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only),
admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials .... (emphasis added).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of The Case
This is an appeal from a final order of the district court granting summary judgment
for Anderson and denying summary judgment for Gardiner. Record 334 (Addendum 11).
Course Of Proceedings
Gardiner filed a three count complaint against Anderson on April 5, 2016. Record 1.
Count I alleged Unlawful Detainer, Count II alleged Breach of Written Contract, and Count
III alleged Unjust Enrichment. Anderson filed an answer on May 23, 2016. Record 87.
On June 1, 2016, Anderson filed a Motion To Dismiss Or In The Alternative For
Summary Judgment and a Verified Memorandum OfPoints And Authorities. Record 93, 96.

Gardiner timely filed a Memorandum In Opposition To Defendant's Motion To Dismiss Or
In The Alternative For Summary Judgment on June 24, 2016. Record 130. Anderson filed

a Reply Supporting Motion for Summary Judgment on July 7, 2016 (Record 181 ), which the
district court struck as the purported Reply was untimely. Order On Motions To Strike
(January 4, 2017) at 3 (Record 368,371) (Addendum 19, 21).
On July 6, 2016, Gardiner filed Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment. Record
168. Anderson filed a Reply and Objection to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on
-7-
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July 26, 2016 (Record 286), which the district court struck as the purported Reply and
Objection was not only untimely, but failed to comply with the technical requirements of
Utah R. Civ. P. 7(d)(l)4 and failed to conform with the requirements of Utah R. Civ. P.
56(a)(2). 5 Order On Motions To Strike (January 4, 2017) at 3 (Record 368, 371)(Addendum
19, 21 ). Nonetheless, the district court found that, "because there were cross motions for
summary judgment," Gardiner's Motion for Summa,y Judgment "is opposed" by Anderson
and the court would consider the "arguments and material from [Anderson]' s Motion to
Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment filed on June 1, 2016 in determining the
cross motions for summary judgment in this case." Order On Motions To Strike (January 4,
2017) at 3 (Record 368,371) (Addendum 19, 21).
After the district court issued a Ruling And Order Re: Dispositive Motions on
December 27, 2016 (Record 334) (Addendum 11) granting summary judgment to Anderson
and denying summary judgment to Gardiner, Anderson filed a Motion And Memorandum Of
Costs And Fees pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 54 and 73. Record 347. The district court denied
Anderson's motion on June 19, 2017 in a Ruling And Order Re: Attorney Fees. Record 488.
Gardiner timely filed in the district court a notice of appeal to the Utah Supreme Court on

4

"The nonmoving party must title the memorandum substantially as: 'Memorandum
opposing motion [short phrase describing the relief requested].' The memorandum must
include under appropriate heading and in the following order ... :".
5

Utah R. Civ. P. 7(d)( 1) requires a "verbatim restatement of each of the moving
party's facts that is disputed with an explanation of the grounds for the dispute supported by
citing to materials in the record under paragraph ( c)( 1) of this rule."
-8-
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July 10, 2017; the Utah Supreme Court subsequently transferred the appeal to this court.
Disposition In The Court Below
On December 27, 2016, the district court issued a Ruling And Order Re: Dispositive
vJ

Motions holding that, while Anderson "breached the lease" (Ruling And Order Re:
Dispositive Motions at 6) (Record 334, 340) (Addendum 11, 16), the lease "does not provide
for damages as requested by Plaintiff." Ruling And Order Re: Dispositive Motions at 8
(Record 334, 342) (Addendum 11, 18). The district court thus granted summary judgment
to Anderson and denied summary judgment to Gardiner.
On June 19, 2017, the district court denied Anderson's motion for attorney fees and
costs in a Ruling And Order Re: Attorney Fees. Record 488.
Statement of the Facts
The district court set forth the material facts not genuinely disputed:

vJ

Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a Lease, on or about October 30, 2013, for
the lease of a warehouse located in the County of Millard, State of Utah. The
term of the Lease was a period of two (2) years commencing on November 1,
2013, and extending to midnight on October 31, 2015. For the months of
November and December, 2013, the agreed rent was $600 per month. For the
months of January through April 2014, the agreed rent was $700 per month.
For May 2014, the agreed rent was $800 per month. For the months of June
2014 through October 2015, the agreed rent was $1,000 per month.

***
\(j}

Paragraph 4 of the Lease provided that Tenant could not "sublet ... the leased
premises ... , without the prior written consent of LESSOR being first
obtained in each instance . . . ." Defendant sublet part of the premises to
Liqua-Dry, Inc. orally, month to month from November 1, 2013 for $2,250,
then for $3,000 a month on November 1, 2014 to March 31, 2015, then signed
-9-
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a 6 month written lease from April 1, 2015 to September 30, 2015 for $5,000
a month.
Defendant sublet the leased premises to Liqui-Dry, Inc. without the prior
written consent of Plaintiff. Plaintiff claims6 he would have agreed to the
sublease if Defendant had paid Plaintiff the difference between Defendant's
rent and what Defendant received from Liqua-Dry Inc. Plaintiff argues 7 he
suffered a loss of the difference between Defendant's rent and what Defendant
received from Liqua-Dry Inc.
Plaintiff claims8 his losses from Defendant's violation of the Lease are the

6

In the posture of this case, it was error for the district court to state that "Plaintiff
claims he would have agreed to the sublease if Defendant had paid Plaintiff the difference
between Defendant's rent and what Defendant received from Liqua-Dry Inc." (Emphasis
added). Utah R. Civ. P. 56(a)(4) provides in pertinent part that "[e]ach material fact set forth
in the motion ... that is not disputed is deemed admitted for the purposes of the motion."
Anderson did not dispute Gardiner's Statement Of Material Facts Not Genuinely Disputed
(in his Motion For Summary Judgment) because his Reply and Objection to Plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment was stricken by the district court. Gardiner's Statement Of
Material Facts Not Genuinely Disputed stated: "Plaintiff would have agreed to the sublease
if Defendant had paid Plaintiff the difference between Defendant's rent and what Defendant
received from Liqua-Dry Inc."
7

In the posture of this case, the district court erred by stating that "Plaintiff argues
he suffered a loss of the difference between Defendant's rent and what Defendant received
from Liqua-Dry Inc." (Emphasis added). As explained in the previous footnote, Anderson
did not dispute Gardiner's Statement Of Material Facts Not Genuinely Disputed, which
stated: "Plaintiff thus suffered a loss of the difference between Defendant's rent and what
Defendant received from Liqua-Dry Inc."
8

In the posture of this case, the district court erred by stating that "Plaintiff claims
his losses from Defendant's violation of the Lease are the difference between Defendant's
rent and what Defendant received from Liqua-Dry Inc totaling $51,200." (Emphasis added).
As discussed in the previous two footnotes, Anderson did not dispute Gardiner's Statement
Of Material Facts Not Genuinely Disputed, which stated: "The losses to Plaintiff from
Defendant's violation of the Lease are the difference between Defendant's rent and what
Defendant received from Liqua-Dry Inc:
11/13

$1,650
-10-
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difference between Defendant's rent and what Defendant received from
Liqua-Dry Inc totaling $51,200. Plaintiff claims9 he was not made aware that
Defendant was subletting the warehouse to Liqui-Dry, Inc. until in or about
late July, 2015.
Paragraph 22(B)(3) of the Lease provides:

12/13

$1,650

1/14
2/14
3/14
4/14
5/14
6/14
7/14
8/14
9/14
10/14
11/14
12/14

$1,550
$1,550
$1,550
$1,550
$1,450
$1,250
$1,250
$1,250
$1,250
$1,250
$2,000
$2,000

1/15
2/15
3/15
4/15
5/15
6/15
7/15
8/15
9/15

$2,000
$2,000
$2,000
$4,000
$4,000
$4,000
$4,000
$4,000
$42000
$51,200

9

In the posture of this case, the district court erred by stating that "Plaintiff claims
he was not made aware that Defendant was subletting the warehouse to Liqui-Dry, Inc. until
in or about late July, 2015." (Emphasis added). As discussed in the previous three footnotes,
Anderson did not dispute Gardiner's Statement OfMaterial Facts Not Genuinely Disputed,
which stated: "Plaintiff was not made aware that Defendant was subletting the warehouse to
Liqui-Dry, Inc. until in or about late July, 2015."
-11-
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(3) Failure by LESSEE to perform any other provision of this
Lease required of LESSEE, if the failure to perform the same is
not cured within ten days after written notice has been given to
LESSEE .... (emphasis added).
Plaintiff sent a letter to Defendant on September 3, 2015 (by certified mail)
giving Defendant written notice of his default and giving him ten days to cure
the default by paying Plaintiff the monies Defendant received from Liqui-Dry,
Inc. and by removing the property of Liqui-Dry, Inc. from the premises.
Pursuant to 1 25 of the Lease, Plaintiff sent the letter to Defendant at 43 70
West 2500 North, Delta, UT 84624. By certified mail of September 14, 2015,
Plaintiff notified Defendant that he had not cured the default and notified
Defendant that Plaintiff was exercising his right, pursuant to 122(C)(I) of the
Lease, to terminate the Lease and notified Defendant that the Lease was
terminated, and notified Defendant, pursuant to 1 22( C)( 1) of the Lease, that
he must "surrender possession of the premises immediately." Pursuant to 125
of the Lease, Plaintiff sent the letter to Defendant at 4370 West 2500 North,
Delta, UT 84624.
Defendant did not pay Plaintiff the difference between Defendant's rent and
what Defendant received from Liqua-Dry Inc. Defendant vacated and
surrendered the premises by the end of September, 2015.
Ruling And Order Re: Dispositive Motions (December 27, 2016) at 1-3 (Record 334-337)
(Addendum 11-13).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Argument 1) Contrary to Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1) and Pentecost v. Harward, 699

P .2d 696 (UT 1985), Anderson's Verified Memorandum OfPoints And Authorities in support
of his motion for summary judgment (Record 96) did not include citations to "particular parts
of materials in the record" and did not state that the facts set forth in the pleading were true
and correct to the personal knowledge of the signer; attempted to verify the entire contents
of the pleading, not just the factual assertions, and some of the facts sworn to were not

-12-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

specific evidentiary facts at all, but were mere assumptions or conclusions. Accordingly,
Anderson's motion for summary judgment (Record 93) should have been denied because a
court shall only "grant summary judgment if the moving party shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law" (Utah R. Civ. P. 56(a)), and Anderson failed to make such a showing in his Verified
Memorandum Of Points And Authorities. Record 96.
Argument 2) Although the district court struck Defendant's Reply and Objection to

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment as it did not comply with Utah R. Civ. P. 7(d)( 1)
(time to file opposition; title of memorandum) or Utah R. Civ. P. 56(a)(2) (grounds for facts
in dispute), and ordered that Defendant's Reply and Objection to Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment "shall not be considered by the Court," the district court "consider[ed]
arguments and material from" Anderson's motion for summary judgment "in determining the
cross motions for summary judgment in this case." Order On Motions To Strike (January 4,
2017) at 3 (Record 368, 371) (Addendum 19, 21). Because Anderson's opposition to
Gardiner's motion for summary judgment was properly struck by the district court, Anderson
did not file an opposition that complied with Utah R. Civ. P. 56(a)(2). Accordingly, the
district court, having no opposition before it, should have granted Gardiner's motion for
summary judgment.
Further, the court should not have considered the "arguments and material from"
Anderson's motion for summary judgment as an opposition to Gardiner's motion for
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summary judgment because those "arguments and material" did not comply with Utah R.
Civ. P. 7(d)( 1) in that they were not "a memorandum opposing the motion" filed "within 14
days after the motion is filed" nor did they comprise "a concise statement of the party's
preferred disposition of the motion and the grounds supporting that disposition," or "a
concise statement of the relevant facts claimed by the nonmoving party and argument citing
authority for that disposition" or "objections to evidence in the motion, citing authority for
the objection." In addition the "arguments and material from" Anderson's motion for
summary judgment did not comply with Utah R. Civ. P. 56(a)(2) in that they did not "include
a verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's facts that is disputed with an
explanation of the grounds for the dispute supported by citing to materials in the record under
paragraph (c)(I) of this rule" nor did they include "a separate statement of additional
materials facts in dispute, which must be separately stated in numbered paragraphs and
similarly supported."

Argument 3) Gardiner sought damages for breach of of 1 4 of the Lease, which
provides that Anderson could not "sublet ... the leased premises ... , without the prior
written consent of LESSOR being first obtained in each instance .... " Record 9 (Addendum
1). Anderson does not dispute that he sublet the premises to Liqui-Dry, Inc., that he charged
Liqui-Dry, Inc. greater rent than he was paying Gardiner, and that he did not obtain
Gardiner's prior written consent to sublet the warehouse. Accordingly, the district court
found that Anderson breached the lease. The district court nonetheless concluded that,
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because the "lease agreement does not provide for damages," summary judgment was granted
to Anderson and denied to Gardiner.
It is "axiomatic in the law that for every wrong there is a remedy." Kramer v. Pix,ton,
72 Utah 1, 268 P. 1029, 1032 (UT 1928). Utah has constitutionalized this mandate in Art.
I, Sec. 11, of its Constitution, which states in part: "every person, for an injury done to him
in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law . . . ."
Constitution of Utah, Art. I, Sec. 11. A "right without a remedy is not a right at all but a
mere abstraction." Willcox v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 357 Pa. 581,600, 55 A.2d 521, 530-

vJ

531 (1947). A "right without a remedy is a nullity." Brownfield v. Board ofEducation, 56
Ohio App. 2d 10, 12,381 N.E.2d 207,208 (1977).
"Damages are properly measured by the amount necessary to place the nonbreaching
party in as good a position as if the contract had been performed." Alexander v. Brown, 646
P.2d 692, 695 (Utah 1982). A defendant's gain is evidence of a plaintiffs damages.

~

TruGreen Cos., L.L.C. v. Mower Brothers, 2008 UT 81, 1116-17, 199 P.3d 929,933 (UT
2008). It is undisputed that Gardiner would have agreed to the sublease if Anderson had paid
Gardiner the difference between Anderson's rent and what Anderson received from
Liqua-Dry Inc., and that Gardiner would have been paid $51,200, the difference between
Anderson's rent and what Anderson received from Liqua-Dry Inc. Anderson is thus liable
to Gardiner for damages for breach of the lease in the sum of $51,200.

Argument 4) Gardiner sought attorney fees pursuant to Paragraph 23 of the Lease
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("defaulting party shall pay to the other party all costs and expenses, including but not limited
to, a reasonable attorney's fee"). Record 16 (Addendum 8). Anderson breached the lease and
was thus in "default in the performance" of the lease. Under the plain language of Paragraph
23, Gardiner is entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee and costs and expenses.

ARGUMENT
I.
ANDERSON'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HA VE
BEEN DENIED AS IT DID NOT COMPLY WITH UTAH R. CIV. P. 56(a)(l)
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(a)(l) provides:
(I) Instead of a statement of the facts under Rule 7, a motion for summary
judgment must contain a statement of material facts claimed not to be
genuinely disputed. Each fact must be separately stated in numbered
paragraphs and supported by citing to materials in the record under paragraph
(c )(I) of this rule.
In particular, Anderson's Verified Memorandum OfPoints And Authorities (Record
96) failed to meet the requirements of Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c)(l):
A party asserting that a fact cannot be genuinely disputed or is genuinely
disputed must support the assertion by:
(A) citing to particular parts ofmaterials in the record, including depositions,
documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations,
stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only),
admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials .... (emphasis added).
In Gil/ettv. Price, 135 P.3d 861 (Utah 2006), the Court explained the purpose of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
In our system, the rules provide the source of available relief. They " [are]
designed to provide a pattern of regularity of procedure which the parties and
-16-
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the courts [can] follow and rely upon." Drury v. Lunceford, 18 Utah 2d 74,
415 P .2d 662, 663 (Utah 1966). Accordingly, the form of a motion does
matter because it directs the court and litigants to the specific, and available,
relief sought.
135 P.3d at 863.
Anderson's Verified Memorandum OfPoints And Authorities in support of his motion
for summary judgment (Record 96) did not include citations to "particular parts of materials
in the record"; rather, Anderson relied upon the fact that his Verified Memorandum OfPoints
And Authorities was "Verified" by him. Anderson's approach was rejected in Pentecost v.
Harward, 699 P.2d 696 (UT 1985):

A verified pleading, made under oath and meeting the requirements for
affidavits established in Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, can
be considered the equivalent of an affidavit for purposes of a motion for
summary judgment. (Citations omitted). In the present case, neither verified
pleading satisfied the criteria of Rule 56(e). For example, neither verification
stated that the facts set forth in the pleading were true and correct to the
personal knowledge of the signer. Both attempted to verify the entire contents
of the pleading, not just the factual assertions, and both impermissibly added
"information" and/or "belief'' to personal knowledge as a basis for the
verification. In addition, some of the facts sworn to were not specific
evidentiary facts at all, but were mere assumptions or conclusions. Some of
these same objections also could be directed to the Harward affidavit.
699 P.2d at 698.
Just as in Pentecost, Anderson's Verified Memorandum Of Points And Authorities
(Record 96) did not state that "the facts set forth in the pleading were true and correct to the
personal knowledge of the signer," it "attempt[ed] to verify the entire contents of the
pleading, not just the factual assertions," and "some of the facts sworn to were not specific
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evidentiary facts at all, but were mere assumptions or conclusions." 10

Accordingly,

Anderson's Motion To Dismiss Or In The Alternative For Summary Judgment (Record 93)
should have been denied by the district court on its face because the court shall only "grant
summary judgment if the moving party shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw" (Utah R. Civ.
P. 56(a)) and Anderson failed to make such a showing in his Verified Memorandum Of
Points And Authorities. Record 96. In granting Anderson's Motion To Dismiss Or In The
Alternative For Summary Judgment (Record 93 ), the district court ignored the plain language

of the Rules of Civil Procedure and deprived Gardiner of the "pattern of regularity of
procedure" which he had a right to "rely upon." Drury v. Lunceford, 18 Utah 2d 74, 415
P.2d 662, 663 (Utah 1966). To give meaning to the Rules of Civil Procedure and to enforce
the Supreme Court's mandate that "the rules provide the source of available relief," Gillett
v. Price, 135 P .3d at 863, this court should reverse the district court and direct the district
court to deny Anderson's Motion To Dismiss Or In The Alternative For Summary Judgment.

IL
GARDINER'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED BECAUSE ANDERSON'S
OPPOSITION WAS STRUCK BY THE DISTRICT COURT
After Gardiner timely filed his Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment (Record

10

Unlike in Pentecost v. Harward, where "neither party objected to the form or the
content of the other's verified pleading and/or affidavit" and "the trial court apparently raised
no objections sua sponte" (699 P.2d at 699), Gardiner objected to Anderson's verified
pleading. Record 130.
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Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

168), Anderson untimely filed his Defendant's Reply and Objection to Plaintiff's Motion for

Summary Judgment. Record 286. The district court struck Defendant's Reply and Objection
to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment as it did not comply with Utah R. Civ. P. 7(d)( 1)
(time to file opposition; title of memorandum) or Utah R. Civ. P. 56(a)(2) (grounds for facts
in dispute). See Order On Motions To Strike at 2 (Record 368, 370) (Addendum 19, 20).
Further, the Order On Motions To Strike stated that Defendant's Reply and Objection to

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment "shall not be considered by the Court." Order On
Motions To Strike at 3 (Record 368, 371) (Addendum I 9, 2 I). Nonetheless, the district court
"consider[ ed] arguments and material from [Anderson's] Motion to Dismiss or in the

Alternative for Summary Judgment filed on June I , 20 I 6 in determining the cross motions
for summary judgment in this case." Order On Motions To Strike at 3 (Record 368, 371)
(Addendum I 9, 2 I ). 11
Gardiner's motion for summary judgment complied with Utah R. Civ. P. 56(a)(l), in
vi))

that it "contain[ed] a statement of material facts claimed not to be genuinely disputed" and
each fact was "separately stated in numbered paragraphs and supported by citing to materials
vi

in the record under paragraph (c)(I) of this rule."

Because Anderson's opposition

(Defendant's Reply and Objection to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment) (Record

11

For the reasons set forth above, in Argument I, the district court should not have
considered Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment at
all, let alone "consider[ed] arguments and material" therefrom in analyzing Gardiner's
motion for summary judgment.
-19-
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286) was properly struck by the district court, Anderson did not comply with Utah R. Civ.
P. 56(a)(2) in opposing Gardiner's motion for summary judgment. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(a)(2)
provides:
(2) Instead of a statement of the facts under Rule 7, a memorandum opposing
the motion must include a verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's
facts that is disputed with an explanation of the grounds for the dispute
supported by citing to materials in the record under paragraph ( c)( 1) of this
rule. The memorandum may contain a separate statement of additional
materials facts in dispute, which must be separately stated in numbered
paragraphs and similarly supported.
Accordingly, the district court, having no opposition before it (particularly one that
complied with Utah R. Civ. P. 56(a)(2)), should have granted Gardiner's motion for summary
judgment. This court should thus reverse the district court and direct it to grant Gardiner's

Motion For Summary Judgment.
Further, the district court failed to comply with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in
"consider[ing] arguments and material from [Anderson]'s Motion to Dismiss or in the

Alternative for Summary Judgment filed on June 1, 2016 in determining the cross motions
for summary judgment in this case" (Order On Motions To Strike (January 4, 2017) at 3
(Record 368, 371) (Addendum 19, 21)) in denying Gardiner's Motion For Summary

Judgment.
As noted above, Gillett v. Price, supra, made clear that Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
~

provide the source of available relief. They "[are] designed to provide a
pattern of regularity of procedure which the parties and the courts [can] follow
and rely upon." Drury v. Lunceford, 18 Utah 2d 74,415 P.2d 662,663 (Utah
1966). Accordingly, the form of a motion does matter because it directs the
-20-
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court and litigants to the specific, and available, relief sought.
135 P.3d at 863.
With respect to an opposition to a motion, Utah R. Civ. P. 7(d)(l) provides in part:
A nonmoving party may file a memorandum opposing the motion within 14
days after the motion is filed .... The memorandum must include under
appropriate headings and in the following order:
(A) a concise statement of the party's preferred disposition of the motion and
the grounds supporting that disposition;
(B) one or more sections that include a concise statement of the relevant facts
claimed by the nonmoving party and argument citing authority for that
disposition; and
(C) objections to evidence in the motion, citing authority for the objection.
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(a)(2) provides:
(2) Instead of a statement of the facts under Rule 7, a memorandum opposing
the motion must include a verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's
facts that is disputed with an explanation of the grounds for the dispute
supported by citing to materials in the record under paragraph (c)(I) of this
rule. The memorandum may contain a separate statement of additional
materials facts in dispute, which must be separately stated in numbered
paragraphs and similarly supported.
The "arguments and material from [Anderson]'s Motion to Dismiss or in the

Alternative for Summary Judgment" did not comply with Utah R. Civ. P. 7(d)( I) in that they
were not "a memorandum opposing the motion" filed "within 14 days after the motion is
filed" nor did they comprise "a concise statement of the party's preferred disposition of the
motion and the grounds supporting that disposition," or "a concise statement of the relevant
facts claimed by the nonmoving party and argument citing authority for that disposition" or
-21-
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"objections to evidence in the motion, citing authority for the objection." Further, the
"arguments and material from [Anderson]'s Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for

Summary Judgment" did not comply with Utah R. Civ. P. 56(a)(2) in that they did not
"include a verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's facts that is disputed with an
explanation of the grounds for the dispute supported by citing to materials in the record under
paragraph (c)( 1) of this rule" nor did they include "a separate statement of additional
materials facts in dispute, which must be separately stated in numbered paragraphs and
similarly supported."
To give meaning to the Rules of Civil Procedure and to enforce the Supreme Court's
mandate that "the rules provide the source of available relief," Gillett v. Price, 135 P .3d at
863, this court should reverse the district court and direct it to grant Gardiner's Motion For

Summary Judgment.
Ill.
BREACH OF THE LEASE BY ANDERSON
ENTITLED GARDINER TO DAMAGES
In the Second Claim For Relief, Gardiner sought damages for breach of the Lease, in
particular for breach of 1 4 of the Lease, which provides that Anderson could not "sublet .
. . the leased premises ... , without the prior written consent of LESSOR being first obtained
in each instance .... " Record 1. Anderson does not dispute that he sublet the premises to
Liqui-Dry, Inc., that he charged Liqui-Dry, Inc. greater rent than he was paying Gardiner, and
that he did not obtain Gardiner's prior written consent to sublet the warehouse. Accordingly,
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as the district court correctly found, Anderson "breached the lease." Ruling And Order Re:

Dispositive Motions at 6 (Record 334, 340) (Addendum I I, I 6). Finally, Gardiner gave
Anderson the notice to cure required by~ 22(B)(3) of the Lease. Anderson did not cure the
breach by paying to Gardiner the difference between Anderson's rent and what Anderson
received from Liqua-Dry Inc. The district court nonetheless concluded, without citing any
authority, that, because the "lease agreement does not provide for damages," Anderson was
entitled to summary judgment and Gardiner was not. Ruling And Order Re: Dispositive

Motions at 6 (Record 334, 342) (Addendum 11, I 6). The district court erred as a matter of
law in concluding that damages could not be awarded for a breach of a lease unless the lease
provides for damages. 12
A. The Law Must Provide A Remedy For A Breach Of A Lease
The Utah Supreme Court held many years ago that it is "axiomatic in the law that for
every wrong there is a remedy." Kramer v. Pixton, 72 Utah I, 268 P. 1029, 1032 (UT I 928).
Indeed, Utah has constitutionalized this mandate in Art. I, Sec. I I, of its Constitution, which
states in part: "every person, for an injury done to him in his person, property or reputation,
shall have remedy by due course of law .... " Constitution of Utah, Art. I, Sec. 1 I.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has observed of this fundamental precept of law:

12

"It is well established under Utah law that, generally speaking, leases are treated
the same way as other contracts." Trans-Western Petroleum, Inc. v. United States Gypsum
Co., 2016 UT 27,379 P.3d 1200, 1204 (UT 2016)
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Not only is the maxim "ubi jus ibi remedium " -- where there is a right there
is a remedy -- one of the proudest declarations of the common law, but it
necessarily implies that a right without a remedy is not a right at all but a mere
abstraction. (Emphasis added).
Willcox v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 357 Pa. 581,600, 55 A.2d 521, 530-531 {1947)
The Ohio Court of Appeals expressed well this fundamental concept in the context
of contracts:
"A contract is a promise or set of promises for the breach of which the law
gives a remedy or the performance of which the law recognizes as a duty."
Restatement, Contracts 1, Section 1 (1932); Williston on Contracts, Section 1
(3d ed. 1957). The maxim "Equity will not suffer a wrong to be without a
remedy," emphasizes the point that where a court recognizes the rightfulness
of a litigant's claim it will endeavor to find a remedy, a way to uphold and
enforce that claim. In short, a right without a remedy is a nullity. A legal
obligation therefore is one which, by definition, contains within it the
recognized right of an obligee to enforce the duty owed to him. (Emphasis
added).
Brownfieldv. Board ofEducation, 56 Ohio App. 2d 10, 12,381 N.E.2d 207,208 (1977).
Thus, because Anderson breached the lease, the law must provide a remedy in
damages.
B. The Measure Of Damages
In TruGreen Cos., L.L.C. v. Mower Brothers, 2008 UT 81, 199 P.3d 929 (UT 2008),
the Court stated:
Under Utah law it is well established that "the injured party in a breach of
contract action has a right to damages based upon his expectation interest ..
. ." (citation omitted). . . . The purpose of these damages is to compensate the
nonbreaching party "for actual injury sustained, so that [the nonbreaching
party] may be restored, as nearly as possible, to the position [it] was in prior
-24-
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to the injury." Mahmoodv.Ross(lnreEstateofRoss), 1999UT 104, 19,990
P.2d 933 (internal quotation marks omitted).
2008 UT 8 I at 1 I 0, 199 P.3d at 931-932.
Notably, the contract at issue in TruGreen Cos., L.L.C. v. Mower Brothers contained
"non-competition, non-disclosure, and employee non- solicitation provisions," but did not
contain a measure of damages. 2008 UT 81 at 19, 199 P.3d at 931. Thus, the issue before
the Court was whether "a former employer is entitled to an award of lost profits damages, or
instead an award of restitution or unjust enrichment damages, where a former employee has
breached contractual non-competition, non-disclosure, and employee non- solicitation
provisions." 2008 UT 81 at 19, I 99 P.3d at 931. The Court held that "lost profits is the
correct measure of damages for a breach of these types of contracts." 2008 UT 81 at 1 9, 199
P .3d at 931. It is notable that, unlike the district court here, the Utah Supreme Court adopted
a measure of damages though none was provided for in the contract at issue.
Similarly, in Alexander v. Brown, 646 P .2d 692, 695 (UT 1982), the contract at issue
provided no measure of damages. Yet the Court had no difficulty in determining the measure
of damages, holding that"[ d]amages are properly measured by the amount necessary to place
the nonbreaching party in as good a position as if the contract had been performed." 646
P.2d at 695. 13

13

In the context of a lease, Jensen v. O.K. Inv. Corp., 507 P.2d 713 (UT 1973),
adopted the holding in Kintner v. Harr, 146 Mont. 461,408 P.2d 487,496 (1965), that a
"covenant in a lease prohibiting assignment without written approval of the lessor is for the
benefit of the lessor .... " 507 P.2d at 717.
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Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In short, the fact that a contract does not provide a measure of damages (as in the
instant case) is of no moment in determining what the measure of damages should be.
Turning to what the measure of damages should be in the instant case, TruGreen Cos.,
L.L.C. v. Mower Brothers recognized a plaintiff's use of a defendant's gain as evidence of

a plaintiff's damages:
[Trilogy Network Sys., Inc. v. Johnson, I 72 P.3d I I I 9 (Idaho 2007)]
concluded that "[t]he profits realized by the defendant may be considered by
the trier-of-fact, if shown to correspond with the loss of the plaintiff." I 72 P .3d
at I 12 I . In making this rule, the court looked to the earlier Idaho Court of
Appeals' decision of Dunn v. Ward. There, the court stated that "the profits
which a defendant realized in violation of his agreement may be considered,
in evidence, if shown to correspond, in whole or in part, with the loss of
plaintiff." Dunn, 105 Idaho 354, 670 P.2d 59, 61 (Idaho Ct. App. I 983).

We find Idaho's reasoning persuasive and adopt it as our own. In doing so, we
are in line with other states that recognize the difficulty of calculating damages
in these situations and thus allow a plaintiff to use as evidence a defendant's
gains. See ... Wirum & Cash, Architects v. Cash, 837 P.2d 692, 71 I (Alaska
I 992) ("[T]he breaching party's profits can be a reasonable basis for estimating
plaintiffs damages."); N. Pac. Lumber Co. v. Moore, 275 Ore. 359,551 P.2d
43 I, 435-36 (Or. 1976) (holding that defendant's profits "are a reasonable basis
for estimating plaintiffs damages").
2008 UT 81, ,I,I 16-17, 199 P.3d at 933. 14
~

14

In New Mexico, the law has been stated thus:

For cases in which profits are the inducement for entering into a contract, lost
profits are the proper measure of damages for a breach of contract if they can
be proven with reasonable certainty.
Strata Prod. Co. v. Mercury Exploration Co., 121 N.M. 622,632,916 P.2d 822,832 (N.M.
1996)
-26-
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The Court further noted that its:
focus is on placing "the non-breaching party in as good a position as if the
contract had been performed." Anesthesiologists Assocs. v. St. Benedict's
Hosp., 884 P.2d 1236, 1238 (Utah 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted).
2008 UT 81, 1119, 199 P.3d at 933.
In the case at bar, it is an undisputed material fact that Gardiner would have agreed
to the sublease if Anderson had paid Gardiner the difference between Anderson's rent and
what Anderson received from Li qua-Dry Inc. Accordingly, if the lease had been performed,

i.e., had Anderson obtained "prior written consent," Gardiner would have been paid $51,200,
the difference between Anderson's rent and what Anderson received from Liqua-Dry Inc.
Anderson is thus liable to Gardiner for damages for breach of the lease in the sum of
$51,200. This court should therefore reverse the judgment of the district court and direct it
to enter summary judgment for Gardiner in the sum of $51,200.

IV.
BREACH OF THE LEASE BY ANDERSON ENTITLED
GARDINER TO ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS AND EXPENSES
In the Second Claim For Relief, Gardiner sought attorney fees pursuant to Paragraph
23 of the Lease, which provides:

~

Should either party default in the performance of any covenants or agreements
contained herein, such defaulting party shall pay to the other party all costs
and expenses, including but not limited to, a reasonable attorneys fee,
including such fees on appeal, which the prevailing party may incur in
enforcing this Agreement or in pursuing any remedy allowed by law for breach
hereof. (Emphasis added).
Record 16 (Addendum 8).
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The trial court correctly held that Anderson "breached the lease." Ruling And Order
Re: Dispositive Motions at 6 (Record 334,340) (Addendum 11, 16). As a result, Anderson
was in "default in the performance" of the lease. Accordingly, under the plain language of
Paragraph 23 ("defaulting party shall pay to the other party all costs and expenses, including
but not limited to, a reasonable attorney's fee"), Gardiner is entitled to a reasonable attorney's
fee and costs and expenses.
In Blackmore v. L&D Dev. Inc., 2016 UT App 198,382 P.3d 655 (UT App. 2016),
this court considered a contract provision virtually identical to Paragraph 23 and held:
In this case, ... the "prevailing party" standard "is not the standard for
awarding fees that the parties included in their contract." . . . . Instead, the
attorney fees provision in the Development Agreement states,
Should any party default in any of the covenants or agreements
herein contained, that defaulting party shall pay all costs and
expenses, including reasonable attorney fees, which may arise
or accrue from enforcing this Development Agreement,
enforcing any covenant or term herein, or in pursuing any other
remedy provided hereunder or by applicable law, whether such
remedy is pursued by filing suit or otherwise.
(Emphases added.) This provision clearly provides that the party who
"defaults" is liable for attorney fees.
2016 UT App at 143,382 P.3d at 666.
The same holds true here; Paragraph 23 of the Lease "clearly provides that the party
who 'defaults' is liable for attorney fees."
Notably, Paragraph 23 is not limited to an award of a reasonable attorney's fee and
costs and expenses where Gardiner recovers damages since Paragraph 23 allows for the
-28-
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recovery of a reasonable attorney's fee and costs and expenses "in pursuing any remedy"
allowed by law for breach of the lease. Accordingly, whether or not this court determines
that Gardiner should have been awarded damages, Gardiner is entitled to an award of a
reasonable attorney's fee and costs and expenses for successfully obtaining a judgment that
Anderson breached the lease. Of course, should the court determine that Gardiner should
have been awarded damages, Gardiner is unquestionably entitled to an award of a reasonable
attorney's fee and costs and expenses.

CONCLUSION
This court should reverse the judgment of the court below, and remand with
instructions to grant summary judgment for Gardiner and to award Gardiner damages of
$51 ,200 and a reasonable attorney's fee and costs and expenses.

T
Attorney for Appellant/Cross-Appellee
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LEASE AGREEMENT

r1L .,

TEIS AGREEMENT, is made and entered into as of this
day of
October, 2013 by and between Richard Gardiner, referred to herein as
"LESSOR," and Nels Anderson, referred to herein as "LESSEE."
WITNESSETE;
In consideration of Lhe ~utual covenants, conditions and agreements
contained herein and the payment of rents herein specified, LESSOR does
hereby lease to LESSEE and LESSEE does hereby lease from LESSOR the real
property and improvements hereafter identified as the demised premises
pursuant to the followi~g terms and conditions:
1.

DEMISED PREMISES.

The demised premises consist of the real property and
improvements, namely a warehouse, situated thereon, located in the County
of Millard, State of Utah, and described more specifically as follows:
Beginning at a point 404.52 feet South and 182.01 feet from the
West quarter corner of Section 6, Township 17 South, Range 6
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, thence South 60 Degrees
09'49" East 290.43 feet; thence South 29 Degrees 32' West 324
feet; thence North 60 Degrees 09'49" West 240.53 feet; thence
North 21 Degrees 34 '01" West 64 .12 feet to a point 50 feet
perpendicular to the East line of the Railroad right of way;
thence North 29 Degrees 32' East 284 feet paralleling the East
line of the Railroad right of way to tPe point of beginning.
Subject to a Right of Way for a County Road, and incidental
purposes as now exists.

Vi

2.

O(J;.

TERM.

The ter ~ h i s lease agreement shall be a period of two (2)
years comrnencin{o~t N~vember 1, 2013, and extending to midnight on
October 31, 201IS-.. -.
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-\ ·\.£!...(!. '~ -~' ~-~·\addition to any other payments or expenses required of
LESSEE herein, LESSEE shall pay to LESSOR, at 7616 Partridge Berry Lane,
Clifton, VA 20124, or at such other place as ~ESSOR may designate in
writing, monthly rental payments in the amount of $1,000 payable in
advance on or before the fifth day of each month. LESSEE shall also pay
LESSOR a security deposit of $2,000 upon the execution of this agreement.

\

3.

\\

4.

RENT.

.. \.
. .\ \ \\;
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1 ...

ASSIGNMENT OR SUBLEASING.

LESSEE shall not assign, mortgage, or encumber this Lease, nor
sublet or permit the leased premises or any part thereof to be used by
-1Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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others for any purpose, without the p1:ior written consent of LESSOR being
first obtained in each instance; provided, however, that regardless of
any such assignment or sublease, LESSEE shall remain primarily liable for
the payment of the rent herein reserved ar.d for the performance of all
the other terms of this lease required to be performed by LESSEE.

5.

COMPLIANCE WITH LAWS AKO INSURANCE.

The premises iereby leased shal: not be used for any unlawful
purpose during the term of the Lease, and LESSEE agrees to comply with
all federal, state, county and city ordinances, laws and regulations,
present or future, affecting the use of or the type of business to be
carried on in the demised premises.
LESSEE shall not use the leased
premises in a manner which shall increase the rate of fire or extended
coverage insurance in the building situate on tte leased premises over
that in effect prior to this Lease.
6.

UTILITIES.

LESSEE shall furnish and t~mely pay for all heat, gas,
electricity, power, water, hot water, lights, and all other utilities of
every type and nature whatsoever used in or about said premises, and
shall indemnify LESSOR agajnst any liability on such account.

7.

MAINTENANCE.

LESSEE shall maintain and repair the demised premises at
LESSEE's sole cost and expense, including, but not limited to, electrical
fixtures, interio= pair.ting and decorating, and glass replacement.
LESSEE shall be responsible for general clean-up when he leaves the
property.
L~SSEE further agrees that all damage or injury done to the
demised premises by LESSEE or by any person who may be in or upon the
premises at LESSEE's invitation er with LESSEE'S permission after the
effective date of this lease shall be repaired by LESSEE at his sole cost
and expense.
8.

LESSOR's RIGHT OF ENTRY.

LESSOR or his agent (s) shall have the right to enter the
demised premises at any reasonable time upon notice to LESSEE to examine
the same and determine the state of repair or alteration which shall or
may be necessary for the safety or preservation of the demised property.
If the demised premises are damaged by fire, wind, storm, or any other
casualty which causes the demised premises to be exposed to the elements,
or if any repairs are needed on an emergency basis for the safety or
preservation of t~e premises, and if LESSEE shall have not made repairs
thereto, then LESSOR may er.ter upon the premises to make such emergency
repairs.
Such action by LESSOR shall not excuse LESSEE from its
obligation to keep the demised premises in good repair.
In that event,
LESSEE s~a:l, upon demand of LESSOa, immediately reimburse LESSOR for the
cost and expense of such emergency repair, together with interest thereon
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from the time of payment by LESJOR at the rate of ten percent (10%) per
annum until paid.

9.

vi

vi

No alteration, addition, or improvement to the demised property
shall be made by LESSEE without the written consent of LESSOR which shall
not be unreasonably withheld by LESSOR.
Any alteration, addition or
improvement made by LESSEE after such consent shall have been given, and
any fixtures installed as part thereof, shall, at LESSOR's option, become
the property of LESSOR upon the termination of this Lease and be
surrendered with the premises; provided, however, that LESSOR shall have
the right to require LESSEE to remove such fixtures at LESSEE's cost upon
the termjnation of this Lease.
Upon the removal of any such fixtures,
LESSEE shall be required to promptly repair any damage er injury done to
the premises by such remcva J. and restore the premises to as good
condition as the same were in at the time LESSEE tcok possession,
reasonable wear and tear excepted. LESSSE shall indemnify LESSOR against
any mechanic's or materialman's lien or other lien arising out of the
making of any alteration, repair, arldition, or improvement by LESSEE, and
shall hold LESSOR harmless of any such liens or claims, includ:.ng
reasonable attorneys fees and costs that may be incurred in removing any
such liens.
10.

~

WASTE.

LESSEE shall not commit any waste or damage to the premises
hereby leased, nor permit any waste or damage to be done thereto.

11.
~

ALTERATIOKS.

PROTECTION OF PROPERTY.

LESSEE agrees to maintain the demised property and improvements
in as good condition as they were at the time LESSEE took possession,
reasonable wear and tear excepted.
At the termination of the Lease in
any manner, L~SSEE will surrender said premises to LESSOR in the
condition above described.
Upon the termination of this Lease, LESSEE
may remove a:-iy signs owned by LESSEE from the demised property, promptly
repairing any damage or injury done to the premises by such removal and
restoring said premises to the condition above described.
12.

INSURANCE.

LESSEE shall maintain and pay fer
coverage insurance upon the demised building
obligation to provide any fire or extended
personal property or contents belonging to
premises.
13.
~

adequate fire and extended
and shall have the duty and
coverage insurance for any
LESSEE within the demised

TAXES.
LESSOR

shall

pay

all

.!"eal

estate

taxes

and
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assessments levied against the demised property, with the exception of
any real estate taxes or personal property assessments on equipment,
machinery, or any other assets of any kind or nature placed in or upon
the demised property by LESSEE.
LESSEE shall pay all other taxes,
licenses, and assessments of every kind, nature and description,
including all taxes and assessments on any equipment, machinery, or
assets of any kind or nature placed in or upon the demised premises by
LESSEE.
14.

FIRE RISK.

LESSEE shall not do anything in the demised premises or bring
or keep anything therein which shall, in any way, increase or tend to
increase the risk of fire or damage by explosion, or which will conflict
with regulations of the fire department or fire laws, or with any fire
insurance policy on the building or any part thereof, or with any rules
or ordinances established by the Health Department or with any municipal,
state, county or federal laws, ordinances or regulations.
15.

ACCEPTANCE OF PREMISES.

LESSEE has examined the demised property and the buildings and
improvements situate thereon, and accepts the sa~e in the condition and
state of repair they are now in.
Neither LESSOR nor their agents have
made any representation with respect to the demised premises except as
are expressly set forth herein.
No rights, easements or licenses are
acquired by the LESSEE by implication or otherwise, except as expressly
set forth in the provisions of this ~ease Agreement.
16.

QUIET ENJOYMENT.

LESSOR covenants and warrants that, if LESSEE shall faithfully
and fully discharge the obligations herein set fo:::-th, LESSEE shall have
and enjoy during the te:::-m of this Lease, a quiet and undisturbed
possession of the demised premises,
together with all of its
appurtenances.
17.

NON-LIABILITY OF LESSOR FOR INJURY OR DAMAGE.

As a consideration for the making of this Lease, LESSOR shall
not be liable for any injury or damage which may be sustained by the
person or property of LESSEE, or any other persons or property, resulting
from the condition of said premises or any part thereof, or from the
street, sidewalks, or subsurface, or from any other source or cause
whatsoever.
Neither shall LESSCR be liable for any defects in the
building, structures, or improvements on the demised premises, latent or
otherwise.
18.

LESSEE INDEMNIFICATION.
LESSEE covenants and agrees not to do or suffer anything to be
-4-
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done by which persons or property in or about or adjacent to the demised
premises may be injured, damaged, or endangered. LESSEE hereby agrees to
inde~nify LESSOR against and to held LESSOR harmless from any and all
clai~s or demands for loss of or damage to property or for injury or
death to any person from any cause whatsoever while in, upon, or about
the demised premises during the term of this lease or any extension
thereof.
LESSEE shall, at LESSEE'S own expense, maintain any workman's
compensation insurance or any other fo~m of insurance required by law
upon the employees or agents employed by LESSEE and LESSOR shall have no
responsibility with respect thereto.
19.

\J

i.¢j

DESTRUCTION.

Tt is understood and agreed that, if the building upon the
demised premises shall be destroyed by fire, the elements, riots,
insurrections, explosions or a~y other cause, or be so damaged thereby
that it becomes untenantable and cannot be rendered tenantable within ten
(10) days from the date of such da~age. this Lease may be terminated by
either LESSOR or LESSEE; provi.ded, however, that in the event the
building is so damaged, LESSEE shall not be required to pay the rental
herein provided during the term the demised premises are wholly unfit for
occupancy.
In the event that only a portion of the demised premises be
damaged or become untenantable, then the rental during the period that
said premises remain partially unter.antable shall be reduced in the
proportion that the untenantable portion cf said premises bear to the
total thereof.

~

20. MUTUAL
COVERAGE.

vi

RELEASE

OF

LIABILITY

TO

THE

EXTEN~

OF INSURANCE

Neithe~ LESSOR nor LESSEE shall be liable to the other for any
business interruption or any loss or damage to property or injury to er
death of persons occurring on the demised property or the adjoining
property, or in any manne~ growing out o: or connected with LESSEE'S use
and occupation of the demised premises, or the co~dition thereof, or the
adjoining property, whether or not caused by the negligence or other
fault of LESSOR or LESSEE er their respective agents, employees,
subtenants, licensees, or a$signees.
This release shall apply only to
the extent that such business interruption loss or damage to property, or
injury to or dealh of persons is covered by insurance, regard:ess of
whether such insurance is payable to or protects LESSOR or LESSEE or
both.
Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to impose any other
or greater liability Jpon eitier LESSOR or LESSEE thaD would have existed
in the absence of the paragraph. This release shall be in effect only so
long as the applicable insuran~e pclicies contain a clause to the effect
that this release shall not affect the right of the insured to recover
under such policies.
22.

DEFAULT.
A.

Time

and

prompt

performance

of

each

and

-5Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

every

term,

~

covenant and condition of this Lease is material and of the essence of
this Lease.
Every term, covenant and condition is a material term,
covenant and condition of this Lease. Performance means compliance that
is f~ll and to the letter of this 1ease. Substantial compliance will not
be sufficient.
Perfo:!:"mance by LESSEE is a condition precedent to
performance by LESSOR.
B.
The following or any of them
default of the terms of this Lease Agreement:

constitute

an

event

of

(1)
Failure by LESSEE to pay when due any ir.stallment of
rent or any other sum here::.n specified to be paid by LESSEE if the
failure continues for ten days;
(2)
Abandonment of the premises by LESSEE without cause
(for the purposes hereof, the failure to occupy and operate the premises
for ten consecutive days shall be concl~sively deemed an abandonment of
the prem~ses by LESSEE);
(3)
Failure by LESSEE to perform any other provision of
this Lease required of LESSEE, if the failure to perform the same is not
cured within ten days after written notice has been given to LESSEE;
(4)
If LESSEE shall file or have filed against LESSEE in
any court p~rsuant to any statute, either in the United States or of any
other
state,
a
Petition
in
Bankr~ptcy
or
Insolvency,
or
for
reorganizations, or for appointment of a receiver or trustee of all or a
substar.tial portion of the property owned by LESSEE, or if LESSEE makes
an assignment for the benefit of creditors, or an execution or attachment
shall be issued agair.st LESSEE on all or a substantial portion of
LESSEE's property, whereby all or any portion of the premises covered by
this Lease or any improvements thereon shall be taken or occupied, or
attempted to be taken or occupied by someone other than LESSEE, except as
may hereir. be otherwise expressly permitted, and such adjudication,
appointment, assignment, petition, execution or attachment shall not be
set aside, vacated, discharged or bonded within ten (10) days after the
termination, issuance, or filing of the same; and
(5)
The taking by any person, except by LESSOR or its
agents or affiliates, of the leasehold created hereby or any part thereof
upon execution, or other process of law or equity other than by
assignment or sublease.
C.
Upon the occurrence of any event of default, and the
failure, neglect or refusal of LESSEE to cure the same during any notice
period required for such default specified above, without further notice
to LESSEE, LESSOR shall be entitled to effectuate such rights and
remedies against LESSEE as are available to LESSOR under the terms of
this Lease Agreement and the laws of the State of Utah, including,
without limitation, the following remedies:
(1)

LESSOR shall have the immediate right, but not the
-6-
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obligation, to ter~inate this Lease, and all rights of LESSEE hereunder
by giving LESSEE written notice of LESSOR's election to terminate.
No
act by LESSOR other than giving notice to LESSEE shall terminate this
lease.
In the event of such termination, LESSEE agrees to surrender
possession of the premises immediately.
Should LESSOR terminate this
Lease, it may recover from LESSEE all damages LESSOR may incur by reason
of LESSEE' s breach, including the cost of recovering the premises,
reasonable attorney's fees, and the worth at the time of such termination
of the excess, if any, of the amount of rent and charges equivalent to
rent reserved in this lease for the re~ainder of the stated term over the
then reasonable rental value of the premises for the remainder of the
stated term, all of which arno~nt shall be immediately due and payable
from LESSEE to LESSOR.
(2)
LESSOR shall also have the right, without process of
law, to enter the p~emises and remove all persons and property from the
premises without being deemed guilty of or :iable in trespass. No such
re-entry or taking possession of the premises by LESSOR shall be
construed as an e:ection on its part to terminate this lease unless a
written notice of such intention is given by LESSOR to LESSEE. No such
action by LESSOR shall be considered or construed to be a forcible entry.
(3)
LESSOR may, at any time, and from time to time,
without terrr.inating this Lease, enforce all of its rights and remedies
under this Lease, or allowed by law or equity, including the right to
recover all rent as it becomes due.
(4)
Tn addition to the other rights of LESSOR herein
provided, LESSOR shall have the right, without terminating this Lease, at
its option, with or without process of law, to reenter and retake
possession of the premises, and all improvements thereon, and collect
rents from any SUBLESSEE and/ or sublet the whole or any part of the
premises for the account of LESSEE, upon any ter~s or conditions
determined by LESSOR.
LESSEE shall be iiable immediateiy to LESSOR for
all costs LESSOR incurs in rel~ttir.g the premises, including without
limitation, brokers' commissions, expenses of remodeling the premises
required by the reletting, and like costs.
Re-letting can be for a
period shorter or longer ttan the rewaining term of this lease.
In the
event of such re-letting, LESSOR shall have the right to collect any rent
which may become payable ~nder any sublease and apply the same first to
the payment of expenses incurred by LESSOR in dispossessing LESSEE, and
in re-letting the premises, and, thereafter, to the payment of the rent
herein required to be paid by LESSEE, in fulfillment of LESSEE'S
covenants hereunder; and LESSEE shall be liable to LESSOR for the rent
herein required to be paid, less any amounts actually received by LESSOR
from a sublease, and after payment. of expenses incurred, applied on
account of the rent due hereunder. In the event of such election, LESSOR
shall not be deemed to have terrninated chis Lease by taking possession of
the premises unless noticE of termination, in wri~ing, has been given by
LESSOR to LESSEE.

-7Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(j)

~

D.
The remedies provided in this Lease Agreement are
cumulative and in addition to any remedies now or later allowed by law or
equity. The exercise of any remedy by LESSOR shall not be exclusive of
the right to effect any other remedy, allowed LESSOR under the terms of
this Agreement, or now or later al~owed by law or eq~ity.
E.
Any delay by LESSOR i.n enforcing the terms of this
Agreement or any considerations or departures therefrom shall not operate
to waive or be deemed to be a waiver of any right to require compliance
that is full and to the letter of this Agreement or to thereafter require
performance by LESSEE in strict accordance with the terms of this
Agreement.

•
~

F.
In the event thac any remedy granted to LESSOR under the
terms of this Agreement is he1d void or unenforceable, LESSOR shall
nevertteless have all of the other remedies provjded in this Agreement
that are not contrary to law.
23.

ENFORCEMEKT.

Should either party default in the performance of any covenants
or agreements contained herein, such defaulting party shall pay to the
other party all costs and expenses, .including but not limited to, a
reasonable attorr.ey' s fee, including such fees on appeal, which the
prevailing party may incur in enforcing this Agreement or in pursuing any
remedy allowed by law for breach hereof.
24.

LESSOR'S RIGHT TO CURE LESSEE'S DEFAULTS.

_,

If LESSEE shall defau~t in the performance of any covenant or
condition in this Agreerrent required to be performed by LESSEE, LESSOR
may, after ten days noti.ce tc LESSEE, or without notice if in LESSOR'S
opinion an emergency exists, perform s~ch c~venant or condition for the
account and at the exper.se of ~ESSEE, in which event LESSEE shall
reimburse LESSOR for al: sums paid to effect such cure, together with
interest from the date of the expenditure at the rate of ten percent
(10%) per annum and reasonable attorneys fees.
All amounts owed by
LESSEE to LESSOR under this paragraph shall be additional rent. In order
to collect such additional rent LESSOR shall have all the remedies
available under this Agreement for a default in the payment of rent and
the provisions of this paragraph shall survive the termination of the
lease.
Nothing in this paragraph provided shall in any way require
LESSOR to perform or correcc any such defaults on the part of LESSEE.
25.

NOTICES.

Service of any notice permitted or required under the terms of
this Agreement shall be deemed complete upon the deposit of the same in
the United States Mail, by Certified or Registered Mail, addressed to
LESSEE at'111" '"'" lf.,;I'. N.::.:r,,. 1.Jt,iA! c.,i.Att fd~L.1
; or addressed to LESSOR at 7616
Partridge Berry Lane, Clifton, VA 20124, as the case may be, or such
1;
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other add=ess as either shall hereafter in writing to the other
designate, or by causing said notice to be served personally upon LESSEE
or on LESSOR as the case may be.
In the event LESSOR elects to hire an
attorney to prepare any Notice of Default required by the terms of this
Agreement, LESSEE shal: pay, in additio~ to any sums required to be paid
to cure said default, or in addition to any other performance required by
such party to cure such default, the costs of preparation of said default
notice, and said default shall not be cured unless and until said costs
are paid. The Notice of Default shall specify the amount of said costs.
26.

vi)

If LESSEE remains in possession of the demised premises after
the expiration date of this lease or the termination of this lease for
any reason, with LESSOR'S acquiescence and without any written agreement
betwee~ the parties, LESSEE shall be a LESSEE at will and except for the
term of such holdover, which shall be at LESSOR's will, the tenancy shall
be subject to all provisions of this Lease Agreement.
LESSEE shall be
responsible to LESSOR for all damage which LESSOR shall suffer by reason
of LESSEE remaining i~ possession after the termination of this agreement
and LESSEE hereby indemnifies :.iESSOR agai.:1St all claims made by any
succeeding LESSEE against LESSOR resulting from delays by LESSOR in
delivering possession of the premises to such succeeding LESSEE. Nothing
in this paragraph shall :Oe construed as a consent by LESSOR to the
possession of the premises by LESSEE after the termination of this Lease
Agreement for any reason.
27.

~

~OLDING OVER.

KEYS AND LOCKS.

LESSEE shall not change locks or insta~l other locks on doors
without the written consent of LESSOR who agrees not to withhold consent
unreasonably.
If LESSEE does change locks or install new locks on any
doors on the premises, LESSEE shall provide LESSOR with one key to each
such new lock.
LESSEE, upon the termination of this Lease Agreement,
shall deliver to LESSOR all keys to any locks on the premises.
28.

LIENS.

LESSEE agrees not to permit any lie~ for monies owing by LESSEE
to become a lien against the demised premises.
In the event any lien is
created against the demised premises on the account of monies owing by
LESSEE, LESSEE shall cause the termination of such lien within ten (:0)
days following discovery of the same by LESSEE. Should any such lien be
filed and not released or discharged or action not commenced to declare
the same invalid within ten (10) days after discovery of the same by
LESS~E, LESSOR may at LESSOR's option (but without any obligation so to
do) pay and discharge such lien.
LESSEE shall repay any sum so paid by
LESSOR and such amounts due to LESSOR shall be deemed additional rent.
29.

~ESSEE AS INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR.
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LESSEE's use of the demised premises shall be as an independent
Lessee and nothing herein shall be deemed to create a partnership, joint
venture, employment, or master-se~vant ~elationship between the parties.
30.

UTAH LAW GOVERNS.

This Lease Agreement shal 1 be governed by, construed,
enforced in accordance with the laws of the State of Utah.
31.

and

MODIFICATION.

This Lease Agreement contains the entire agreement between the
parties, and may not be modified or changed orally, but only by an
agreement in w~iting and signed by the party against whom enforcement of
any waiver, change, modification, or discharge is sought.
32.

BINDING ON SUCCESSORS.

It
is
f~1rther
expressly
agreed,
that
the
provisions,
st~pulations, terns, covenants: conditions and undertakings in this lease
and any renewals thereof shall inure to the benefit of and bind the
heirs, executors, administ~atcrs and ass~gns or successors in interest of
both the LESSOR a~d LESSEE.

\

I

'

'
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\

.
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DEC 2 7 2016
.. I,°"

.i .•

";.:!

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT~-~~~~1;':_:.~_,_-;;~ . .
MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RICHARD E GARDINER,

RULING AND ORDER RE: Dispositive
Motions

Plaintiff,
V.

NELS ANDERSON,
Defendant.

Case No. 160700010
Judge Jennifer A. Brown

The matters before the Court are Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for
Summary Judgment filed June 1, 2016, and Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment filed July
6, 2016. Plaintiff filed his Memorandum in Opposition on June 24, 2016 and Defendant's
Memorandum in Opposition was stricken by this Court. Defendant filed a Reply Memorandum
in Support of his motion on July 7, 2016. Oral arguments were heard on October 24, 2016, at
which time the Court took the matter under advisement. Having reviewed the pleadings
submitted by the parties and hearing the arguments of counsel, and being fu)ly advised in the
premises, the Court now enters the following Ruling:

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a Lease, on or about October 30, 2013, for the lease
of a warehouse located in the County of Millard, State of Utah. The term of the Lease was a
period of two (2) years commencing on November 1, 2013, and extending to midnight on
October 31, 2015. For the months of November and December, 2013, the agreed rent was $600
per month. For the months of January through April 2014, the agreed rent was $700 per month.
~

For May 2014, the agreed rent was $800 per month. For the months of June 2014 through
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October 2015, the agreed rent was $1,000 per month.
Defendant contends he moved out before the 10 day Notice to Quit required it (thus,
defendant was not in unlawful detainer); Defendant had paid all rents due; and left the premises
better than when Defendant first rented it.
Paragraph 4 of the Lease provided that Tenant could not "sublet ... the leased premises .
. . , without the prior written consent of LESSOR being first obtained in each instance .... "
Defendant sublet part of the premises to Liqua-Dry, Inc. orally, month to month from November
1, 2013 for $2,250, then for $3,000 a month on November I, 2014 to March 31 2015, then signed
a 6 month written lease from April 1, 2015 to September 30.. 2015 for $5.000 a month.
Defendant sublet the leased premises to Liqui-Dry, Inc. without the prior written consent of
Plaintiff. Plaintiff claims he would have agreed to the sublease if Defendant had paid Plain ti ff the
difference between Defendant's rent and what Defendant received from Liqua-Dry Inc. Plaintiff
argues he suffered a loss of the difference between Defendant's rent and what Defendant
received from Liqua-Dry Inc.
Plaintiff claims his losses from Defendant's violation of the Lease are the difference
between Defendanf s rent and what Defendant received from Liqua-Dry Inc totaling $51,200.
Plaintiff claims he was not made aware that Defendant was subletting the warehouse to LiquiDry, Inc. until in or about late July, 2015. Paragraph 22(8)(3) of the Lease provides:
(3) Failure by LESSEE to perfonn any other provision of this Lease required of
LESSEE, if the failure to perform the same is not cured within ten days after
written notice has been given to LESSEE .... (emphasis added).
Plaintiff sent a letter to Defendant on September 3, 2015 (by certified mail) giving Defendant
written notice of his default and giving him ten days to cure the default by paying Plaintiff the

2
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monies Defendant received from Liqui-Dry. Inc. and by removing the property of Liqui-Dry.
Inc. from the premises. Pursuant to ,i 25 of the Lease, Plaintiff sent the letter to Defendant at
4370 West 2500 North, Delta, UT 84624. Ry certified mail of September 14, 2015, Plaintiff
notified Defendant that he had not cured the default and notified Defendant that Plaintiff was

exercising his right, pursuant to 122(C)(l) of the Lease. to terminate the Lease and notified
Defendant that the Lease was temiinated, and notified Defendant, pursuant to 122(C)(l) of the

...

Lease, that he must "surrender possession of the premises immediately.,, Pursuant to ~ 25 of the

Lease, Plaintiff sent the letter to Defendant at 4370 West 2500 North, Delta, UT 84624.

Defendant did not pay Plaintiff the difference between Defendant's rent and what
Defendant· received from Liqua-Dry Inc. Defendant vacated and surrendered the premises by the

end of September, 20 J5. Plaintiff argues that to date, Defendant has not paid to Plaintiff the
difference between Defendant's rent and what Defendant received from LiquawDry. Inc.

DISCUSSION

Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs motions for summary judgment
and states that the court shall grant summary judgment if the moving party shows "that there is
no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). In addition, "[t]he party moving for summary judgment has the
burden of presenting evidence that no genuine issue of material fact exists." Uintah Basin Med.
Ctr. v. Hardy. 2008 UT 15, 1 16~ 179 PJd 786 (citing Rule 56(e)). The Utah appellate courts
have made clear that "the nonmoYing party is entitled to all inferences ari~ing from the facts of

rt!t;ord." Id at 1 18 (citing Hermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52, ~ 1O. 48 P.3d 235).
v;j

3
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to thls standard,
-1·:.. P~rsuant
•,,
. the Court finds that there are no genuine issues of material fact

-~-

-

pr~cluding the court from granting summary judgment in this case. It is undisputed that
Defendant sublet the premises to Liqui-Dry without prior written authorization as required by the

lease agreement. It is also undisputed that Plaintiff served Defendant with a 10-day notice to
quit or cure required by 122(8)(3) of the Lease and Defendant vacated the premises promptly
thereafter.

Unlawful Detainer
Utah Code Ann. §78B-6-80 I (9) defines ··unlawful detainer'' to .. mean[] unlav.1ully
remaining in possession of property after receiving a notice to quit. served as required by this
chapter, and failing to comply with that notice." According to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6802(1 )(d), a tenant is guilty ofan unlawful detainer if the tenant ·'assigns or sublets the leased
premises contrary to the covenants of the lease, or commits or permits waste on the premises
after service of a three calendar days' notice to quit." 1

1

Plaintiff argues that in Utah Code Ann. § 788-6·802(1 )(d), the comma separating the phrase "assigns or sublets the
leased premises contrary to the covenants of the lease" from the following phrase indicates that the phrase ·•after
service of a three calendar days' notice to quit" modifies only the phrase "commits or pennits waste on the
premises."' Accordingly, Plaintiff contends that no notice is required by the unlawful detainer statute for an acrion
for sublening the leased premises contrary to the covenants of the lease.
The Court is not persuaded hy Plaintiffs argument. Courts arc ·•to interpret the provisions of a statute in harmony
with other statutes in the same chapter and related chapters." State "'· J M.S. 2011 UT 75,, 22 1 280 P.3d 410
(internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally. courts should seek to avoid interpretations "which render some
part of a provision nonsensical or absurd." O'Dea v. Olea. 2009 UT 46., 32, 21; P.Jd 704 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Here, aside from a comma. the Coun does not find anything within the unlawful detainer statute
which would indicate that unauthorized subletting somehow supersedes the notice provisions contained therein or
that the legislature intended for a party to be in unlawful detainer (and subject to the punitive nature of treble
damages such as those requested by Plaintiff in this matter) without notice. Such an interpretation would render the
notice requirements for all other unlawful detainer actions nonsensical or absurd. Accordingly, the Court declines to
find Defendant in unlawful detainer prior to notice having been given by Plaintiff.

4
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Paragraph 4 of the Lease provided that Tenant could not ''sublet ... the leased
premises ... , without the prior written consent of LESSOR being first obtained in each
instance ... _,, Defendant does not dispute that he sublet the premises to Liqui•Dry, Inc. and that
he charged Liqui-Dry, Inc. greater rent than he was paying Plaintiff. Further, Defendant did not
obtain Plaintiff's prior written consent to sublet the warehouse. Accordingly, Defendant breached
the lease. However, Defendant complied with the 10-day notice to quit and did not ··unlawfully
remain in possession of the property.•, lJCA §788-6-80 I(9).

Plaintiff argues that under Code § 78B-6-811 ( I )(b), the court may enter han order for the
restitution of the premises," and. under Code § 78B-6-811 (2)(b ), the court "shall also assess the
damages resulting to the plaintiff from" an "unlawful detainer." Thus, it is apparent that the Utah
State Legislature contemplated that damages would be recoverable for ··sublet[ ting] the leased

premises contrary to the covenants of the lease .... " Plaintiff argues its losses are '~directly
traceable" to Defendant's breach of the lease and Plaintiff may recover those losses as damages.

However. Utah Code Ann § 78B-6-81 l (2) does not specifically provide for damages for
subletting contrary to the lease agreement. It provides:

v;

(2) The jury or the court, if the proceeding is tried without a jury or upon the defendant's
default, shall also assess the damages resulting to the plaintiff from any of the following:
(a) forcible entry~
(b) forcible or unlawful detainer;
(c) waste of the premises during the defendant's tenancy. if waste is alleged in the
complaint and proved at trial;
(d) the amounts due under the contract, if the alleged unlawful detainer is after
default in the payment of amounts due under the contract; and
(e) the abatement of the nuisam:e by eviction as provided in Sections 788-61107 through 78B-6-1114.

5
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Additionally, the lease agreement does not specifically provide for damages. It only
states that "regardless of any such assignment or sublease. LESSEE shall remain primarily liable
for the payment of th~ rent herein reserved and for the perfonnance of all the other terms of this
lease required to be performed by LESSEE."
It is undisputed that Defendant was current on rent and was only evicted for defaulting

under the )ease agreement by subletting without prior written consent. Also. there is some
evidence that Defendant notified Plaintiff's agent of the subletting via email almost a year prior
to Plaintiff enforcing that provision of the lease. Accordingly, the Court finds the requested
$51,200 in damages to be excessive. There is nothing in the statute or the lease agreement to
support such damages. Furthermore, according to the definition of unla\\iful detainer found in
UCA §78B-6-80 I (9), Defendant was not in unlawful detainer. Therefore, the only remedy
Plaintiff appears to be entitled to is a declaration under UCA §78B-6-81 l(c) that the lease

...

agreement is forfeited due to Defendant's failure to perform a condition or convent therein.
Breach of Contract

In the Second Claim for Relief, Plaintiff seeks damages for breach of the Lease, in
particular for hreach of paragraph 4 of the Lease, which provides that Defendant could not
0

sublet ... the leased premises ... , without the prior written consent of LESSOR being first

obtained in each instance .... " Uefendant does not dispute that he sublet the premises to LiquiDry, Inc. and that he charged Liqui-Dry, Inc. greater rent than he was paying Plaintiff. Further,

Defendant did not obtain Plaintiff's prior written consent to sublet the warehouse. Accordingly,
Defendant breached the lease. Finally, Plaintiff gave Defendant the notice to cure required by 1
22(B)(3) of the Lease.

6
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Plaintiff argues that Defendant did not cure the breach by paying to Plaintiff the
difference between Defendant's rent and what Defendant received from Liqua-Dry Inc. and has
not done so to date. Defendant contends that he vacated possession and turned it over to Plaintiff
landlord immediately upon notice. As a result, Defendant cannot, as a matter of law. be in
unlawful detainer. Moreover, the fact he may have defaulted the lease by subletting without
written permission only creates a default, but that default never ripened to unlawful detainer
because tenant returned possession to Landlord. The parties dispute whether Utah Code Ann.
§78B-6-802(d) requires the continued subletting .. after service of a 3 day calendar notice to
quit." Plaintiff contends the 3 day notice is only required for the provision '~or commits or
permits waste on the premises." Plaintiff argues to interpret it otherwise would nullify the entire
provision. However, the definition of unlawful detainer found in UCA §78B-6-801 (9) seems to
support Defendanf s interpretation of the statute that the unauthorized subletting must continue
after service of the notice to quit.

CONCLUSION
Plaintiff seeks damages in the amount of $51,200, representing the difference between
what Defendant paid in rent to Plaintiff and what Defendant collected from Liqua-Dry for the
unauthorized subletting. The Court does not find support for these damages in the unlawful
detainer statute or the lease agreement. Utah Code §78B-6-801(9) defines "unlawful detainer" as
"unlawfully remaining in possession of property after receiving a notice to quit. .. and failing to
comply with that notice." The Court finds that Defendant complied with Plaintiffs 10 day
notice and did not remain in unlawful possession of the property. Furthermore, even if
Defendant were in unlawful detainer pursuant to 78B-6-802(1 )(d) for the unauthorized subletting

7
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of the property, Section 78B-6-811 (2) does not specifically provide for damages for
unauthorized subletting. Furthennore, the lease agreement does not provide for damages as
~

requested by Plaintiff. Accordingly, Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby
DENIED and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

This ruling constitutes the final order of the Court on this issue. No further order is
necessary to effectuate the Court's decision.
DATED this

c:27

fl
day of December. 2016.

. Brown
t Court Judge
iJ

~
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The Order of the Court is stated below:
/s/ ANTHONY HOWELL
Dated: January 04. 2017
JO: 18: 11 AM
District Court Judge

vJ

Todd Anderson (#12432)
Anderson Law Center, P .C.
PO Box 183
259N. Hwy6
Delta, UT 84624
Telephone: 435-864-4357
Facsimile: 435-216-3106
todd@deltaattomey.com

Attorney.for the Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE ST ATE OF UT AH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MILLARD
Fourth District Court, 765 South Highway 99, Fillmore, UT 84631

RICHARD E. GARDINER,
Plaintiff,

ORDER ON MOTIONS TO STRIKE

vs.
Civil No.: 1607000 I 0
NELS ANDERSON,
Judge: Anthony Howell
Defendant.

Before the Court is Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Defendant's Reply and Plaintiff's Motion to
Strike: Defendant's Reply and Objection to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. At a hearing
held on October 24, 2016, Plaintiff was represented by Todd F. Anderson and Defendant was
represented by Marlin J Grant. At that hearing the Court ruled on these two motions from the bench.
Regarding those Motions,

THE COURT FINDS:
1. In regards to Defendant's Reply Supporting Motion for Summary Judgment filed on July 7,

VP

January 04, 2017 10:18 AM
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2016 (the "Reply"), the Court finds that the time prescribed by Utah R. Civ. P. 7(e)(l) had
lapsed prior to the Reply being filed, no motion to extend the allotted response time had been
made or granted by the Court.
2. In regards to Defendant's Reply and Objection to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment
filed on July 26, 2016 (the "Objection"), the Objection fails to comply with the requirements
of Rule 7 in the following regards:
I. To the extent that the filing was a memorandum opposing Plaintiff's Motion for

Summary Judgment, the Court finds that the time prescribed by Utah R. Civ. P. 7(d)
(I) had lapsed for the Defendant to file memorandum opposing Plaintiff's Motion for

Summary Judgment, and no motion to extend the prescribed time had been made or
granted by the Court.
2. The Objection failed to comply with the technical requirements of Utah R. Civ. P.
7( d)( I), which provides that "[t]he nonrnoving party must title the memorandum
substantially as: 'Memorandum opposing motion [short phrase describing the relief
requested].' The memorandum must include under appropriate heading and in the
following order ... :" (Emphasis added).
3. Moreover, the Objection failed to conform with the requirements of Utah R. 56(a)(2)
in that it failed to include ''verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's facts
that is disputed with an explanation of the grounds for the dispute supported by citing
to materials in the record under paragraph (c)(I) of this rule."
3. However, in that there are cross motions for summary judgmen~ the Court does find that
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is opposed by Defendant and will consider the
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argument<; and material from Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for
Summary Judgment filed on June 1, 2016.
IT IS ORDERED:
1. Plaintifrs Motion to Strike Defendant's Reply and Plaintifrs Motion to Strike:

\Jl

Defendant's Reply and Objection to Plaintifrs Motion for Summary Judgment

(collectively the "Motions") are both GRANTED.
2. The following filings are stricken and shall not be considered be the Court.

1. Defendant's Reply Supporting Motion for Summary Judgment filed on July 7, 2016
2. Defendant's Reply and Objection to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment filed
on July 26, 2016.
3. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is opposed because there are cross motions for
summary judgment and the Court will consider arguments and material from Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment filed on June 1, 2016 in
determining the cross motions for summary judgment in this case.
4. Plaintiff is awarded his reasonably incurred attorney fees and costs associated with the
Motions.

*****END OF ORDER*****

Approved as to Form:
~

Isl Todd F. Anderson
Todd Anderson, attorney for Plaintiff
Isl Marlin J. Grant, by TFA per instruction email on 12/29/2016
Marlin J. Grant, attorney for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I caused to be served on all other c-filers in this case, and as identified below. a true and exact copy
of the following described documen 4 via the Court's electronic filing process. Any party not currently subscribed as an
e-filer has been served by regular U.S. Mail on Wednesday, January 04. 2017.
DOCUMENT SERVED: (proposed) ORDER

ON MOTIONS TO STRIKE

PERSONS SERVED: via electronic filing
Marlin J. Grant
Attorney for Defendant
PERSONS SERVED: via regular mail
PERSONS SERVED: via email

Isl Todd F Anderson
Todd F. Anderson
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